Abstract. In the last decade canting keels have moved from the exotic to the mainstream in offshore racing yacht design. Now classes from Minis to Maxis are designed with canting keels, but several recent high profile failures in the Vendee Globe and Sydney Hobart have brought designers back to the drawing board to have a closer look at the design and construction methods involved for both the keel fin and the actuation system.
INTRODUCTION
Since canting keels appeared successfully in offshore racing in the Mini Transat in the early 1990's they have been destined to become part and parcel of sailing design. In recent years they have become the norm on many ocean racing classes -open 50's and 60's, Volvo Open 70's and many maxi boats, and are growing in numbers and popularity in high performance cruising yachts.
This paper focuses mainly on the experience of Owen Clarke Design on the design, construction and analysis of keels completed in-house for both racing and cruising yachts. Much of the information is drawn from four of our Open Class yachts -referred to in the text specifically and in date (and design) order:- Further investigations into fin design have been carried out for this paper, both to increase our understanding of the performance of the yacht and to try and discover the likely cause of the keel failure of Ecover at the finish of the 2004-5 Vendee Globe race.
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
The main aim of canting the keel is to provide extra righting moment. It has taken the ballast keel one stage further and eliminates the need for a large number of crew to be sitting on the windward rail. Whilst adding water ballast, the displacement of the boat is increased at the same time as increasing righting moment, so that either the trim or heel angle or both are affected. Using a canting keel keeps the displacement the same and only affects the heel angle. The advantage then being that a lower displacement boat will have a lower drag, but if the righting moment can be kept high so the same amount of sail can be carried the boat will be faster. 
Figure 2. Comparison of resistance with increasing displacement
As in so many things, there's nothing for free, and the reduction in resistance from lower displacement is somewhat offset by the necessity upwind for a daggerboard to replace the keel fin which becomes inefficient as a lift producing device at angles greater than 15-20 degrees of cant [1] Resistance Vs Speed w ith and w ithout Daggerboard This all holds true for cruising boats where there is less of an emphasis on outright performance, although there are still benefits of a faster and/or lighter and cheaper boat. With a canting keel the same righting moment can be achieved with a lower draft, which is often an important consideration for access to harbours when cruising. It can also improve quality of life on board where a canted keel reduces heel angle when sailing, given that a flatter boat makes most tasks, from sail handling to sitting down to eat, much easier.
General Arrangement
The in-house arrangement of the keel structure and arrangement is as follows -a similar pattern has been used for all our keels built to date.
The canting mechanism is hydraulic in boats other than minis where a purchase system is used.
The keel is normally mounted between two bulkheads, one of which is usually the mast bulkhead and is therefore already substantially reinforced. This makes a strong box structure that is stiff enough to resist the loads from the keel and canting mechanism, especially the torsional loads. This type of sectioning is aimed at eliminating the twisting of the hull when the keel is loaded and reduces the risk of misalignment of the rams The keel pivots on two plates mounted on reinforced sections of bulkhead. The pivot is aligned with the base of the canoe body and the pivots faired underneath the hull.
In order to keep the arrangement and seals simple, the keel exit point/pivot is open to sea. This is contained within a wet box so that the extension of the fin is above the waterline and the rams connect to the top. There is easy access for inspection, through either hatches or removable panels. There are seals (boots) around the ram exits from the wet box
Rams are mounted between two webs joined by a horizontal shelf. The hydraulic box is mounted on the end of the ram, with the piping run to the motor and sump, which can be mounted as suits the layout of the yacht. Keel controls are duplicated in the cockpit and nav' station. 
CRUISING BOATS
The benefits and fashion of canting keels doesn't go unnoticed in the cruising world Their use for cruising boats is now becoming more common as owners strive for higher performance. This leads to a whole new set of parameters for the designer. Interior space is critical on a cruiser and the ram and hydraulic machinery will be vying with accommodation. There is also often a limit on draft for cruising boats and this has led to the development of a canting lifting keel system.
Adding one more complication to the structure and hydraulics, the lifting-canting keel shown below utilizes two rams within the keel case to lift the keel 1.3m. With the keel raises the boat is not to be sailed and it is recommended to be motored in calm waters towards an anchorage. The cant rams operate on the keel case rather than the directly on the fin, and only when the keel is lowered to the sailing position. 
CLASS LIMITATIONS
Most classes have some restrictions on the keel design, be it directly, such as materials or bulb weight, or indirectly, for example the vcg position or righting moment. Even in classes where the rule doesn't specify a value for the bulb weight (as the Volvo Open 70 rule does) the designer's main task is to increase the righting moment (RM) whilst minimizing drag. A brief summary of some of the rules we have been involved with follows.
In IMOCA Open classes [2] this is limited indirectly by a static heel angle, and AVS (angle of vanishing stability) restrictions, and a maximum draft of 4.5m for the 60' boats, but there is still the challenge of increasing the RM. There is a minimum AVS with keel canted and ballast of 108 degrees. Being one of the first classes to have canting keels as a regular design option, safety rules have also been developed for locking the keel in the event of hydraulic failure and being able to work the hydraulic system with a manual pump.
The Volvo Open 70 rules limits boats by a bulb weight minimum of 4000kg. Also there is a minimum AVS of 115 degrees when canted, with the maximum cant angle being 40 degrees. The keel must be capable of being held (locked) in any position by one ram.
The Mini class rules (Open 6.5m boats), have a maximum draft of 2 metres and there must still be positive stability of 45kg attached to masthead with the boat heeled to 90 degrees. As for the IMOCA class boats there is a maximum 10 degree heel angle with the keel canted and water ballast on the same side of 400 litres maximum.
For cruising boats operating in Europe under 24m, the RCD [3] rules apply and using the ISO standard 12217-2 [4] these determine an AVS related to the area of boat operation (inshore or offshore) and displacement. The RCD also uses a STIX (stability index) calculation which includes various factors such as knockdown factor, dynamic stability and inversion recovery factor to determine overall stability and buoyancy characteristics. This ensures suitable levels of safety for the type of use and is normally not difficult to achieve for a canting keel boat.
STRUCTURAL DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
Fin keels are designed primarily for supporting the ballast bulb. To this end, they are designed to optimise weight, drag and centre of gravity. We take the view that for offshore racing, indeed for any sailing, the fin is critical, and as such is designed conservatively. Safety factors and margins are usually exceeded comfortably and reliability of the system is of absolute importance.
Materials
Keel fins materials are often specified by rules, for example the Volvo Open 70 rule limits material to steel, steel alloys and bronze alloys. Open classes have only limited the bulb material (this year they banned tungsten by specifying a maximum density of 11.3) which leaves options for either a composite or steel fin.
Composite keels can suffer from a tendency to flutter, which given the high proportion of unidirectional fibres required running down the axis of the fin, leaves the keel prone to delamination. Two sister yachts for the last Vendee were built with carbon fins and experienced problems.
At OCD we have so far been what we feel is conservative and have only built either solid or fabricated high tensile steel fins..
Scantlings
Open class rules leave the strength options open for designers to decide, with very vague scantling rules used such as 'strong enough' Race boat rules have evolved from the ABS Guide for Designing Offshore Racing Yachts. The Volvo Open 70 rule is from a mix of this and other sources. Cruising boats must conform to the RCD and its associated standards. The ISO standard 12215-9 [5] which determines appendage attachment for ballast keels (used in conjunction with the RCD) is under development though currently it says that the analysis should only be used for non canting keels. For a comparison of scantling rules see Table 1 .
For the sailing load, the calculation is a fairly simple global cantilever problem. The safety factor is designed to take slam loading, fatigue, sailing loads, and grounding loads into account, so main aspects of design concentrate on detailing.
Fatigue
With the cycling loads experienced on the keel with wave loading and canting it is normally expected that keels have a practical life of 60,000 miles of offshore racing on Open class designs. After this they are inspected more frequently, or replaced before a long offshore race. We strongly recommend replacing keels at this stage if the boat is to circumnavigate again.
Important criteria in the design of the fin are to keep stress concentrations to a minimum. With this in mind all sharp corners, areas of high stiffness and welds in line with the load action are kept to a minimum.
Evolution
We are now evolving our fifth generation of Open 60 keel and the design has been evolving along with the boat.
Design stresses that we have been using have been decreasing over the years from 40% of yield for Kingfisher in 1999 to 34% of yield for Ecover in 2003, so that the safety factors have been increasing and the overall design getting more conservative.
This approach has been taken partly because after 60,000 miles of service the onset of some fatique cracking showed up on two plug welds in the middle of Kingfishers keel during a routine NDT check after completing the Vendee Globe in 2000.
We also take into consideration, as we continue to increase our safety margins, the increased performance and competitiveness of the fleet in the races like the Vendee. With speed records tumbling and elapsed times falling the boats are being pushed harder than ever. Canting keels will need to continue to evolve for some time to come using tried and tested methodology, while at the same time learning from mistakes and experience gained on the race course.
Fabricated vs. Solid Keels
At OCD we have mainly looked at two types of keel, both steel alloy but either fabricated, where plates are welded on to a central box type beam as below, or a solid machined down to a foil cross-section.
Figure 6. Typical Fabricated Fin Section
The main differences from a practical viewpoint are that the solid fin can be made with a smaller surface area, but has a weight penalty. However, for a given righting moment this decreases the bulb weight required. The fabricated fin is lighter but to enable the second moment of area to be sufficient it has to have a greater chord length, leading to a higher wetted surface. More weight must then be added to the bulb for the same righting moment as the solid fin.
Fabrication considerations
Tolerances on dimensions are specified only as positive, not negative to ensure that there are no reductions in expected strength. One method of fabricating a keel is to make it oversize, say using 12mm plate and then machine it down to the required thickness, say 10mm. This tends to leave more material in place than was originally designed. There can therefore be, in some areas of the keel a change in design stress level from 34% down to 30% yield due to the extra cross sectional area.
The fins are carefully quality controlled throughout build using a third party inspector. Fabricated keels have 100% of welds close to the keel root inspected, by ultrasound and magnetic particle, decreasing to 30% of the welds closer to the tip.
All the OCD canting keel fins have been made at the same fabricator in a controlled environment. This ensures familiarity with the construction for subsequent keels and has built up a good working relationship. The last keel for Skandia was engineered and fabricated without OCD involvement and so it is not appropriate to comment on it in this report. The same consulting engineer was however utlised in the design of that keel, as well as the original Kingfisher and Ecover keels.
Load verification
The hydraulic system incorporates pressure relief valves to protect the hydraulics from overloading. This can be set to relieve at a known pressure which relates to a given loading condition on the keel. This means that at any point that the keel is subjected to loadings in excess of the design load, the keel cant is lost. This is not a system failure, but a safety feature.
On a newly launched boat the valve is set to relieve just above the expected sailing loads on the keel. This setting may need minor adjustments during early sailing trials. During the boat's life there are occasionally instances when the system overloads and the valve is adjusted until its setting matches the loading. Owen Clarke Design maintain a historical record of these settings and use them in later designs.
Hydraulic System
Hydraulic failure is rare. In such an event there is the potential for leakage and loss of pressure, however, if this is on the return part of the cylinder there is a failsafe to ensure that the keel remains in position. A similar system applies for double rams, if one fails catastrophically then the second is a backup. If the second ram isn't sized to take the full load of the keel, in an emergency it is possible to increase the system pressure from 2000psi to 3000psi to operate the keel normally. The minimum safety position is that one ram can withstand full load with maximum safety factor at the lower pressure without the keel canted. Again, even with a power failure after this has been done, pressure in the system will hold the keel in place.
Other safety features include the addition of a handpump that can be used in event of failure of the hydraulic pump -although hard work for the crew, the keel can be canted normally.
Both IMOCA and Volvo Open 70 rules state that there must be a way of fixing the keel centrally to stop several tons of lead pivoting below the hull out of control, causing further structural damage to the hull and potentially compromising watertight integrity. The maxi yacht (not the Open 60' as mentioned in the introduction) Skandia had this happen in the 2004 Sydney Hobart and the yacht was abandoned (the keel later fell off).
Keel Inspections and NDT
As a minimum all Owen Clarke Design keels are independently NDT inspected during construction, prior to delivery and before, but as close as possible to completing 20,000 miles service.
Keels are routinely examined by eye each time a yacht is lifted from the water. Signs of paint loss, rust streaks or paint cracking can be initial signs that there could be problems.
A more detailed inspection is carried out before major races. Any areas that look suspicious are further investigated. It is important for race/maintenance teams to realise the importance of good maintenance and to minimise corrosion of keel surfaces. Excessive corrosion and pitting leads both to increased local stress and reduced fatigue life particularly in areas of high load where high stresses can promote rapid corrosion once it has started.
ECOVER KEEL ANALYSIS
The Open 60 Ecover suffered a keel failure on the last day of the 2004-5 Vendee Globe. This failure occurred at only @ 40,000 miles of service. Our first Open 60 keel for the yacht Kingfisher was designed to 20% higher strain values and at the end of the 2000 Vendee Globe had completed @60,000 miles. The second Open 60, Hexagon, also has a keel built to the same specification which has shown no signs of fatigue cracking after a similar mileage. All three keels have been built by the same manufacturer.
Failure is unacceptable, but a design life for this kind of keel of only 40,000 miles is also not sufficient. For both reasons it was imperative for Owen Clarke Design to find out why a keel with lower design stresses and whose design did not fundamentally differ should have such a markedly reduced service life.
The failure occurred between two stainless steel bosses where a crack (in red) appears to have begun propagating from a weld that attaches a conical plate (in green) introduced into the design to reduce stress concentrations. This conical plate did not exist in the original Kingfisher design. The crack extended aft along the outside plate and into an internal box section spar until such time as the outside plate lost structural integrity and failed in tension. The elongated vertical slots indicate plug welds between the external plate and internal structure. The shorter cone indicates the size of the cone designed. There is a discrepancy between this and the dimensions of the cone that was actually manufactured. This we will deal with in the conclusions.
Figure 7.
On recovering the broken stub from the yacht on its return to the UK a visual examination was undertaken by both Owen Clarke Design and by John Wilson, an independent engineer and NDT specialist. The reason for the failure was indeterminate from a visual inspection although there were clear indications that that the keel failed in fatigue, but no certainty as to why. Owen Clarke Design commissioned an analysis of the keel by plant reliability specialists MPT Solutions as well as a review of the keel design utilising finite element analysis that was undertaken by Matrix Engineering.
Finite element analysis
Finite element engineering was carried out on Kingfisher's first keel by Roger Scammel the original designers of that keel and the consulting engineer involved in the design of Ecover's keel. The purpose of the review of the FE investigation on Ecover's keel was to see if any of the design modifications made over the years were the cause or were a contributing factor to the failure. Matrix engineering carried out a global study of the keel stresses which are shown in Figure 8 . Note that the minimum specified 0.2% proof stress for the Bisalloy 80 steel plate is 6.9 x 10^8 Pa and the ultimate tensile strength of 7.9 x 10^8 Pa. The FE study was undertaken on a solid model provided by Owen Clarke Design that replicated both the internal structure of the keel and the external profiles.
Figure 8.
The global model clearly shows low stress values in the area between the two keel bosses where the keel actually failed. Figure 9 highlights the area around the forward boss as it was designed in earlier keels before an additional conical plate was welded behind the solid (duplex 2205) stainless pivot boss to relieve this concentration. A detailed and separate study of the conical plates shown in Figure 11 below confirms that along the edge of the weld including the area in which the keel failed the stress is generally 1.84 to 1.99 x 10^8 Pa. 
Charpy impact tests
One of the possible reasons for failure may have been an unsuitability of the plate material ductility, that would have been revealed by reduced impact values in the as welded condition especially at low temperatures. In order to review the manufacturers' data a series of charpy impact tests were undertaken. The result of the tests was that at 0 Celsius and at -20C the test values recorded were very similar, the average result being 210 joules. These values far exceeded the minimum requirement of the plate specification and the typical values quoted by the makers.
Hardenss tests
During the manufacture of the keel the temperature in welded areas is monitored and hardness values tested afterwards to ensure conformity to maximum values. Excess heat in a weld will increase tensile strength at the expense of creating a more brittle structure prone to cracking, this would be evident in a higher value of Brinell Hardness. In order to check the conformity of the keel post failure, Brinell Hardness tests were undertaken on plate drawn from different positions and also on a cross section taken through the welded area where fatigue cracking was observed to occur.
The Brinell Hardness values found indicate a tensile strength in the plate of circa 9.17 x 10^8 Pa which corresponds well within the plate manufacturers range of 7.9 to 9.3 x 10^8 Pa. Typical hardness values were 268, 271 and 266. In the area through the fatigued area the values were 296 (plate), 299 (HAZ) and 296 (weld). These values are slightly higher than the maximum figure required by the manufacturing QA procedure which asked for a Brinell number of 280 in the HAZ.
The hardness figures resulting from the investigation are not considered excessive as these were taken using a 10mm ball. The fabrication specification aims for figures close to the unwelded plate hardness, which provides for a little tolerance. There could be some residual hardness in the material due to the working associated with the fracture type. It could be that some welding processes exceed 350BHN, hence the need to select the processes and control heat inputs.
Macroscopic and microscopic examination
Two sections were taken from the fillet weld at the fatigue cracking point. These were metallographically prepared and examined. Although the angle at which the fillet met the plate was not ideal there were no notches, undercut, or signs of lack of fusion or inclusion. The microstucture of the weld region was typical of that expected being made up of ferrite and pearlite, with bainite in both the fusion and heat affected zones. The Bisalloy plate was also inspected and consisted of very fine grains of predominantly bainite typical of the mill manufacturing process.
Investigation Conclusions
The conclusions drawn from reviewing in total the preliminary examination, finite element and laboratory investigation reports are as follows:
1. The keel failed due to fatigue from service stresses exceeding the fatigue strength of the material.
2.
It could not be determined from the evidence that the fatigue cracks propagated from the weld into the plate material but they probably did. That is the failure probably began at the weld joining the cones to the keel.
3.
No evidence of manufacturing defects were observed except for a slightly high BHN of 299 in the HAZ of the fatigued weld which is unlikely to have had any significant effect and the excess length of the cones attached to the pivot bosses.
4.
No evidence of non-conformity to specification was found in the outer plate material.
It is apparent from the preliminary investigation and the lab reports that the keel failed in fatigue, however, the reasons why and therefore what we are really interested in, ie. the solutions to the problem, are not.
Concentrating on the area of the cones as being the failure point the factors that may have contributed singularly or in various combinations to cause this failure are as follows:
1.
The global design stress used for the keel may be too high and although the allowable stresses in the plate in the region of the pivot bosses is far above what is required, additional stiffness would reduce the values of any local stress concentrations.
2.
The addition of the cones although they reduced local stress concentrations increased local heating in the keel in an area of higher global stress and added to residuary stresses that cannot be taken into account in the finite element engineering.
3.
The keel manufacturer mistakenly made the cones over length and the new geometry carried the fillet weld for the cones over a plug weld further into the keel. The crack appears to have begun directly over the intersection of the fillet weld securing the forward cone and that plug weld.
4.
The additional length of the cones meant that the welding process was also carried on further into the body of the keel where the global stresses increase, exasperating any increased stress value that may exist due to residual stresses from fabrication. 5.
The design was based partly on historical data such as the first Kingfisher keel that had a design stress 20% higher than the Ecover keel.
It is however difficult to equate the amplitude and frequency of the service loads between two different yachts four years apart, with a different race history. The additional safety margin introduced for the design stress to cover a variety of factors may not have been sufficient to reflect the level of competition and the pace these yachts are now being driven at. 6.
The step transition between the cone welds and the main plate, whilst not considered excessive, was a factor that may have adversely affected stress levels.
Actions
It is not possible to tie down any one point as the principle cause of the failure. Since this is the case it will be prudent to design a new keel in such a way as to take into account all of the above factors even though this may result in a significantly over-engineered structure. It is necessary to achieve a new datum against which other keels can be measured and designed, in much the same way as we originally used the Kingfisher as a successful datum. This design can then be monitored throughout its life for signs of fatigue in order to provide real hard data regarding the service life of these structures. Accordingly Owen Clarke Design intend to:
Decrease the design stress of the external plate by at least an additional 20% 2.
Alter the design of the pivot bosses so that the conical development is part of the boss themselves. The length of the bosses to be minimised and kept if possible to the existing dimensions. Undertake FE analysis as part of this review process. 
4.
Work with suppliers and have independent quality control and selection of plate prior to it arriving at the keel manufacturer to ensure lowest defect plate and conformity to specification. 5.
Increase inspection criteria for higher % of welds outside critical areas. Critical areas are already 100% inspected. 6.
Attempt to ensure that welds transverse to the plate rolling direction is kept to a minimum 7.
Compile a new schedule of inspections and checks in collaboration with the third party inspector who usually oversees the construction of the fabricated keels. 8.
Set the NDT reporting levels higher and record all defects above a given set of dimensions. This will provide an improved database for the comparison and the assessment of any in service examinations and permit evaluation on any defect growth. This may also provide improved data for refining the design parameters.
CONCLUSIONS
In the limited space of this paper we have attempted to show our current understanding of canting keel design. Like so many new features of design, canting keels have their own set of problems to be overcome. Even as the paper was written the new Volvo 70 class has been experiencing teething problems in the first leg to Cape Town. This does not necessarily mean the rules or designs are wrong, but that further refinement is needed to increase reliability in all areas of the systems.
Clearly there is always work to be done refining loadings and analysis. Further practical experience and more boats with canting keels will improve calculations and safety of these boats.
It is also important to note that without correct operation or maintenance there is never such a thing as a safe design and it is important for the designer to work closely with the clients to ensure that the keel is correctly used and monitored throughout its lifespan. 
